Stephen Haber

Working Papers


An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up

An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up ABSTRACT: A large literature asserts that standard essential patents (SEPs) allow their owners to “hold up” innovation by charging fees that exceed their incremental contribution to a final product. We evaluate two central,...

Patent Holdup: Do Patent Holders Holdup Innovation?

Patent Holdup: Do Patent Holders Holdup Innovation? by Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, and Ross Levine May 7, 2014 ABSTRACT: President Obama and Congress have recommended major patent reforms based on the belief that the patent system allows patent holders to...

Where Does Democracy Thrive

Where Does Democracy Thrive: Climate, Technology, and the Evolution of Economic and Political Institutions Stanford University and NBER August 24, 2012 ABSTRACT: Why are some societies characterized by enduring democracy, while other societies are either persistently...